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IN THE SUPREME CO,URT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NEW HAMPISHIRE INS·URAN•C'E 
COMP'ANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
BALLARD·-W AD'E, INC., M. R. 
BALL·ARD, JR., and LQR.AJL, 
PETER.SON, 




STATEn1ENT O·F THE KIND O·F CASE. 
The case on appeal herein involves an action by 
plaintiff against Ballard-Wade, Inc., and M. R. Ballard, 
Jr., on a lease wherein plaintiff as assignee of its in-
sured sought to recover from these defendants the 
amount expended by it to repair damage to the leased 
premises caused by a fire which occurred while an em-
ployee of defendants was using the premises in the 
course of his employment and in the course of his em-
ployer's business. 
1 
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DIS·POSITION IN LOWER 1COUR!r 
The Third Judicial District Court (Judge A. H. 
Ellet) ruled as a matter of law that the lease, covering 
the damage·d premises, between defendants Ballard-
Wade, Inc., and M. R. Ballard, Jr., lessees, and the 
Patricia Graff Trust, lessor, plaintiff's insured and 
assignor, imposed liability by its t erms against defend-
ants for the damage to the leased premisies. Having 
imposed liability upon defendant lessees as a matter 
of law, the sole question in the non-jury trial was the 
amount of damage sustained by plaintiff. Upon the 
conclusion of the trial plaintiff was granted judgment 
against defendant lessees for the sum of $4,200.00 plus 
interest and costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondent seeks to have the Supreme ·Court sus-
tain the findings and conclusions and affirm the judg-
ment of the lower court. 
S.T'.AJTE1\fENT' OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, New Hampshire Insurance Company, is 
a corporation authorized to do business in the State 
of Utah. (R. 1, 4) Ballard-Wade, Inc., is a Utah cor-
poration with its principal place of business located at 
1231 ·South Main Street, Salt Lake ·City, Utah. (R. 110, 
T-58) Defendant, M. R. Ballard, Jr., is the president 
of Ballard-Wade, Inc. (R. 109, ·T-57); Loral Peterson is 
an e1nployee of the corporate defendant and at the time 
of the fire loss hereinafter referred to was acting within 
2 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the scope of his employment and in the- course of his 
employer's business (R. 13). The Patricia Graff T'rust 
is the owner of certain real property located at 12'31 
South Main Street, Salt iLake 'City, Utah, which property 
is insured by a fire insurance policy issued by plaintiff 
as the insurance carrier of the Trust ( R. 13). 
On November 14, 1955, the Patricia Graff ·T'rust, 
by and through its trustees, entered into an agreement 
with Ballard-Wade, Inc., and M. R. Ballard, Jr., whereby 
the pren1ises located at 1231 S·outh Main Street were 
leased to the latter for a period of five ( 5) years. (R. 
13, 16-19) ·The premises were to be used exclusively by 
the lessee for the operation of a used car sales business 
and related business. (R. 17) While in the course of his 
employment on March 6, 1961, and while inside one of 
the buildings on the leased premises, Loral Peterson 
vvas draining gasoline from the gas tank of a customer's 
car into a sump on the floor, and in the process of per-
forming this function an explosion occurred resulting in 
a fire which totally destroyed the customers automobile 
and which extensively damaged the building (See D'eposi-
tion of Loral Peterson (pp. 6-10). It is generally thought 
that fumes from the gasoline being drained onto the floor 
were ignited by the flames from a furnace located in the 
same building but placed in a different room. 
Pursuant to its obligation under the fire insurance 
policy issued by it to p·atrica Graff T'rust, plaintiff re.-
paired the damage to the leased building caused by the 
fire. The cost of repairing the damage was $5,903.96, 
which amount 'vas paid by plaintiff (R. 13). As part 
3 
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of the adjustment of the loss Patricia Graff Trust by 
l(irk Graff, one of the Turstees, assigned to the plaintiff 
all and any of the rights, claims or causes of action \vhich 
the r~Prust had against the defendants for the damage to 
the leased premises. (R.72, T. 19, Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No.3) 
Subsequently, plaintiff initiated this action against 
defendants framing the complaint in two counts; the 
first count being based on negligence and the second 
count being based on liability under the lease. 
At the pre-trail plaintiff made a motion to the Pre-
T'rial Judge to declare Paragraph 8 of the Lease Agree-
ment between its insured and defendants controlling in 
the case and to declare defendants liable for damages to 
plaintiff as a matter of law. The motion was denied and 
interpretation of the lease was reserved for the Trial 
Court. (R. 15) 
Before the case was to be tried, it having been as-
signed to Judge A. H. Ellett for that purpose, plaintiff 
moved the Trial Judge to rule on the matters of law, viz., 
interpretation of the lease provisions, \Yhich had been 
reserved for the determination of the Trial Judge by 
the Pre-Trial Judge. (R. 54, T. 1) Judge Ellett ruled at 
that tin1e that the defense of contributory negligence 
and assumption of the risk asserted by defendants to 
plaintiff's first count \Yere not applicable and therefore 
not good defenses. (R. 57, T. 4) He also held that P'ara-
graph 8, the Indemnity Provision of the lease, by its 
terms in1posed liability on the corporate defendant and 
4 
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l\L R. Ballard, Jr., as signers of the lease, and ruled 
that the only question for the trial was damages. ;There-
upon, the Trial Judge dismissed plaintiff's negligence 
count and plaintiff proceeded on the indemnity provision 
of the lease. ( R. 58, ·T'. 5) 
At the trial defendants sought to call witnesses to 
show that the Trial Judge's interpretation of the indem-
nity provisions of the lease was erroneous and that the 
parties thereto did not intend the provision to mean 
'vhat it said. Counsel for the plaintiff objected to the 
offer of proof and the Trial Judge sustained the objection 
on the ground that such proof was not within the scope 
of the issues to be tried. (R. 63, T·. 10) 
From the ruling of the Trial Judge and from the 
judgment in this action, defendant Ballard-W a.de, Inc., 
and M. R. Ballard, Jr., appeal. 
ARGUME.NT 
P·OINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING 'THAT 
THE LEASE IMPOSED LIABILITY ON THE LESSEE AS 
A MATTER OF LAW. 
The provisions of the lease agreement out of which 
the controversy on appeal arises are as follows: 
1. MAIN'T·ENANCE: ·L,essee acknowledges 
that he has examined the premises above de-
scribed, together with the improvements build-
. ' 1ngs and hard surfacing thereon, and further ac-
knowledges that the same are in good condition, 
and that he accepts said premises in their present 
5 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
condition. Lessee agrees at his own expense to 
maintain all of said premises, including roof, ex-
terior, interior, plumbing, heating, electrical fix-
tures and glass in the building on said premises in 
a good and useable condition and to maintain the 
hard surfacing of the premises in a good and use-
able condition, and at the expiration of this Lease 
or sooner termination thereof to surrender said 
premises in as good condition as when received, 
ordinary wear and tear, unavoidable damage by 
fire, the elements or other casualties excepted. 
Lessee may at his own expense remodel said 
premises, provided however, that no structural 
changes shall be made without the prior written 
consent of the Lessor. All improvements made 
or added by Lessee (except signs) shall become 
a part of said premises and shall remain thereon 
at the expiration or sooner termination of this 
Lease or any extension or renewal thereof. Les-
see agrees to furnish Lessor with space for one 
office at the northern end of the building on said 
prernises, rent free and utility free (except for 
telephone) for the first three (3) years of this 
~Lease. 
8. INDEMNITY: The Lessee will exonerate, 
save harmless, protect and indemnify Lessor from 
and against any and all losses, damages, claims, 
suits or actions, judgments and costs which shall 
arise or grow out of any injury to or death of 
persons and/ or damage to property, caused ?Y, 
arising from, or in any manner connected w1th 
the exercise of any right granted or conferred 
hereby, or the use, maintenance, operation and/or 
repair of the said premises, buildings, equipment, 
machinery and appliance thereon, whether s~s­
tained 1 by Lessee or Lessor, 'their xespootive 
agents or employees 01: by any other perso~s or 
corporations which seek to hold the Lessor hable. 
6 
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There are sixteen provisions in the lease agreement 
dealing with various rights, duties and obligations of 
lessor and lessee and the provisions are nl1mhered con-
secutively and captioned accordingly. Although the 
agreement is one for the leasing of real property to 
lessor the lease becomes, among other things, an indem-
' . 
nity contract by virtue of Paragraph No. 8 thereof. 
"Indemnity" means reimbursement, restitution, or 
compensation for loss, Traveler's Insurarnce Company 
vs Georgia Power Company, '51 Ga. App. 579, 18'1 E. 
111; National Bank of Monroe vs Wright, 77 Ga. App. 
272, 48 S.E.2d 306, 308; Lavar vs M aga~, (~fun. 1Ct.) 1 
NYS 2d 743, 744; Rogers vs Shawnee Fire Insurance 
Company of Topeka, 132 Mo. App. 275, 111 S.W. 592, 
593, and as such one may contract to indemnify another 
for a loss agreed upon and stated in their agreement. 
In general, there are two kinds of indemnity con-
tract, viz., (1) contract of indemnity against liability, and 
(2) a contract of indemnity against mere loss or damage. 
A cause of action arises in favor of the indemnitee 
against the indemnitor under a contract of indemnity 
against liability only when the liability of the indemnitee 
arises. However, a cause of action arises in favor of the 
indemnitee against the indemnitor under a contract of 
indemnity against loss or damage when the loss is suf-
fered by the indemnitee. Duke vs Tyler, 209 Iowa 1345, 
230 N.W. 319, 321; Freigy vs Gargaro Company, 223 
Ind. 342, 60 N.E.2d 288; Tri-State Casualty Insurance 
Company vs Stekoll, 201 Okla. 548, 208 P.2d 545, 549"; 
42·C.J.8., Indemnity~ 2, p. 565. 
7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Validity and effectiveness of an indemnity provision 
or contract does not require that there be a loss by the 
indemnitee in the form of a liability over to a third party 
or a person other than the contracting parties. In ex-
plaining this principle the ·Court said in Board of Insur-
ance Commissioners vs Kansas City Title Insurance 
Comp~arny, Tex. Civ. App. 217 S.W. 2d 695, 697: 
In a strict sense 'reinsurance' is indemnity 
and 'indemnity' is insurance or reinsurance in 
so far as each may provide payment for loss or 
damage suffered, since to that extent each in-
cludes the essential element of reimbursement for 
such loss or damage. 
Rice vs National Credit Insurance Company, 164 Mass. 
285, 41 N.E. 276 (1895) was an action on an account 
due (which is irrelevant for purpose of this discussion). 
In that case the inde1nnitee had acquired a bond of in-
den1nity to cover losses to his customers. ·The Court 
indicated that no liability of the indemnitee over to third 
persons need be shown inasmuch as the indemnitor's 
liability arose upon the indemnitee's loss and not his 
liability to third parties. 
It is a well established principle of contract law 
that indemnity agree1nents or contracts are to be con-
strued as any other contract, and that giving words their 
legal, natural and ordinary meaning or construction is 
controlling where the language is neither technical nor 
ambiguous. 27 Am. Jur., Indemnity § 14. Where the 
contract is complete on its face and is in plain, simple 
and unambiguous language, the rights of the parties 
are controlled and 1nust be determined by its language. 
8 
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420.J.S., Inde1nnity, § 8. Real Estate-Land Title and 
Trust Company vs William Cohen Building and Loan 
Association, 130 Pa. Super 207, 197 A 511 (19·38). In 
llfarks vs NYC Transit Authority, 187 NYS 2d 693, 17 
1fisc. 2d 583 (1959) there was a contract between the de-
fendant 'Transit Authority and the third party defendant, 
painting contractor, vvhich contained a provision under 
which the painting contractor undertook and agreed to 
indemnify the Transit Authority. The indemnity pro-
vision was clear and definite and was given effect. 
Almost all jurisdictions, if not all, have wrestled 
with the problem of interpreting or construing indem-
nity provisions and the rights and duties of the parties 
to such an agreement. The ·Court in Southern Pacific 
Company vs JJ!orrison-Knudsen Company, 216 Or. 398, 
338 P.2d 665 ( 1959) had this to say: 
Since the parties themselves dealt with the 
question of indemnity in their written contract, 
we think it fair to say ... that they intended it 
(the contract) rather than some general common 
law rule, to govern their rights and liabilities. 
And in speaking of this subject in two other cases, 
Russell vs. Lemmons, Oiv. App., 205 S.W.2d 629 (1947) 
and Central Surety and Insurance Corporation vs 
Martin, Civ. App., 224 S.W. 2d 773 (1949) the Courts 
said: 
·The nature of appellant's liability on the in-
d~~nity contract must be determined by its pro-
VISions, following the familiar maxim of law that 
as a man binds himself, so shall he be bou~d. 
Relative to any contract, including those which con-
9 
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tain indemnity proVIsions, the courts universally say 
that the intent of the parties will govern, and the con-
tracting parties are held to their clear and understand-
able language deliberately committed to writing and 
signed by them. 
Moore vs Standard Paint and Glass, 145 ·c·olo. 151, 
358 P.2d 33 (1960) involved the interpretation of an in-
demnity provision in a lease agreement which said: 
". . . Lessor shall not be liable to lessee, its employees 
and customers, nor the public for any defect in the 
leased premises ... nor for any injury or damage that 
may occur from the elements and lessee will hold lessor 
harmless from all liability or claims with respect to such 
defects or injuries." 
On the basis of that part of the provision that states 
that the tenant (lessee) would hold the landlord (lessor) 
harmless from all liability or claims with respect to 
defects in premises or injury or damage occurring from 
the elements, the tenant was held liable for damages 
caused by the collection of water in the basement of the 
leased premises as a result of a cloud burst and flooding 
which the lessor had allowed to exist for a considerable 
period of time. 
The ,Court's reason for holding the lessee liable to 
the lessor under the circu1nstances was that the terms 
of the indemnity provision indicated a clear understand-
ing by the parties that some injury might occur and the 
lessor leased the premises only upon the express agree-
rnent of the lessee that the latter would indemnify the 
lessor for any and all liability or loss which might occur. 
10 
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In construing an indemnity provision in a construc-
tion contract wherein a subcontractor agreed to indem-
nify the contractor from all claims of injured parties, 
etc., in Brotherton Construction Company vs Patterson-
Emerson-Comstock, Inc., 178 A.2d 696 (19'63), the Court 
attempted to ascertain the intent of the parties. In doing 
so it did not restrict itself to the language used in th~ 
contract but considered circumstances surrounding the 
parties and their object in making the agreement. The 
Court said: 
In construing the agreement, the 1Court must 
ascertain the intention of the parties, and in doing 
so it is not confined to the language used, but 
may consider the circumstances surrounding the 
parties and their object in making the agree-
ment .... They usually intend to provide against 
loss or liability of one party through the opera-
tion of the other, or caused by physical conditions 
which are under the control of the other and 
over which the party indemnified has no 
control. ... 
As to the use of extrinsic evidence in construction 
of lease agreements and specific provisions contained 
therein, the follov1ing cases are representative: 
Erickson vs. Bastian, 98 Utah 587, 102 P.2d 310, 
express terms of a 'vritten contract may not be changed 
or nullified by parol nor may such parol testimony ante-
cedent to the reduction of the agreement to writing be 
considered where the language of the contract is clear 
and unambiguous. Harvey Machine Company, Inc., vs 
li atzel and Buehler, Inc., 54 Cal. 2d 864, 353 P'.2d 924 
(1960) where circumstances of the claimed wrongful con-
, 
11 
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duct dictate that damages resulting therefrom were 
intended to be dealt with in the [indemnity] agreement, 
there is no room for construction of the agreement. It 
speaks for itself. 
Continental Bank and Trust Company vs. Bybee, 
6 Utah 2d 528, 306 P.2d 773 if an ambiguity in a contract 
can be reconciled from a reasonable interpretation of 
the instrument, extrinsic evidence should not be allowed. 
The intent of the parties to the contract should be as-
certained first, fro1n the four corners of the instrument 
itself, second, from other contemporaneous writings con-
cering the same subject matter, and third, from the ex-
trinsic parol evidence of the intentions. 
The law, then, in this area is unequivocal. In con-
struing a contract provision one must look to the words 
of the contract which reflect the agreement and presum-
ably the intention of the parties thereto. If the contract 
is unambiguous, the \vords are given their usual, natural, 
and ordinary 1neaning, which it is assumed all average, 
reasonably intelligent people know and understand, and 
the parties having made their agreement are bound by it. 
If a particular provision in the agreement is not clear, 
the ,c·ourts then look to the entire contract for assistance 
in ascertaining the meaning. 
Paragraph 8 of the Lease Agree1nent in question is 
an indemnity provision and is so entitled. In clear, un-
ambiguous, and unequivocal terms it states that "the 
Lessee \Vill . . . inde1nnify Lessor from ... amy and all 
losses ( e1nphasis added) ... \vhich shall arise or grow 
12 
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out of ... damage to property, caused by, arising from, 
or in any manner connected with the exercise of any 
right granted or conferred hereby, or the use, mainten-
ance operation and/or repair of said premises, buildings, 
... whether sustained by Lressee or Lessor, their re-
spective agents or employees or (emphasis added) by 
and other persons or (emphasis added) corporations 
"vhich seek to hold the Lessor liable." ·The paragraph 
sets forth a provision of indemnity against loss by the 
Lessor. It clearly states that if the Lessor sustains any 
loss or damage to its buildings which loss results from 
the exercise of any right conferred under the lease, viz., 
by reason of the use or maintenance of said buildings, 
then Lessee will indemnify Lessor for such loss. It be-
comes necessary to shed the vestment of reasonableness 
and under the accepted legal standards of construction to 
engage in conclusive mental thrashing to arrive at an 
interpretation of this indemnity provision so distorted 
as to be able to say it is ambiguous. If it is not ambig-
uous, the parties are bound by what they agreed to and 
defendants were not entitled to produce extrinsic evi-
dence from defendants, or any other source, to vary the 
terms of the written contract. 
The Trial Judge held that the agreement was unequiv-
ocal by its terms and that if Lessor sustained any loss 
defendants must indemnify the Lessor or its assj gnees 
for such loss, and in doing so he precluded defendants 
from introducing oral evidence in an attempt to show 
that the provision meant something other than what it 
clearly stated. It is plaintiff's position, which is earnest-
13 
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ly urged upon the Court, that the Trial Judge did not 
err in his ruling. 
In attempting to show an ambiguity on the face of 
the lease, de-fendants quote the provisions of paragraph 
4. They insist that its terms are either inconsistent with 
or take precedence over paragraph 8. However, para-
graph 4 is a maintenance provision and it is so entitled. 
It relates to the upkeep of the premises and the sur-
render of them to Lessor. 'The important applicable part 
of the paragraph is as follows: 
". . . Lessee agrees at his own expense to main-
tain all of said premises, ... in a good and useable 
condition, and, at the e~piration of this Lease or 
sooner termination thereof to surrender said 
premises in as good condition as when received, 
ordinary wear and tear, unavoidable damage by 
fire, the elements or othe rc.asualties excepted ... " 
D·efendants assert that since this provision requires 
then1 to 1naintain the buildings at their ow'll expense, 
except for unavoidable fire, paragraph 8 cannot be con-
strued to impose absolute liability upon them for loss 
as an indemnity against loss agreement. Plaintiff can-
not agree "\Vith that position for the following reasons: 
1. The provision is one relating to maintenance re-
quiring defendants to keep the buildings in their pos-
session or control and "\vhile doing so, to continue to 
preserve them in essentially the same condition as when 
taken under the lease ; 
2. Upon the termination of the lease and after de-
fendants have used the premises and maintained them, 
14 
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then defendants are to surrender the premises in as good 
condition as 'vhen received, unavoidable damage by fire 
excepted; 
3. If at the termination of the lease, defendants sur-
render the buildings which had been damaged by an un-
avoidable fire, it still has a duty to repair, maintain, or 
preserve the b~ilding but repairing it under the main-
tenance aspect of the agreement requires that the build-
ings be repaired by Lessee at its expense while the sur-
render of premises terms merely states that Lessee may 
surrender the building to Lessor in a damaged state. 
There is no implication in the lease that Lessee does 
not have to repair for any fire loss. Viewed in light of 
this construction of paragraph 4, there c-an be little 
question that the two provisions, paragr~ph 4 and para-
graph 8, require the Lessee to repair and maintain the 
buildings while using them, and upon expiration of the 
lease to either repair any damage to the buildings at its 
expense or surrender them to 1Lessor in a damaged con-
dition and indemnify Lessor for any damage to the 
buildings. 
Plaintiff asserts that the lease -agreement is plain 
and unambiguous in its terms, that Lessor and Lessee 
purposely agreed upon an indemnity against loss by 
Lessee to protect property that was part of a trust and 
which the Lessor's Trustees had a legal duty to p-ro-
tect. 
Plaintiff further urges upon the Court that the Trial 
Judge acted properly and did not err in ruling that the 
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indemnity provision of the lease imposed liability for 
loss upon lessor as a matter of la'v and in refusing to 
permit oral evidence by defendants to alter the terms 
of the lease. 
POINT II 
THE PROPER DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IS AF-
FIRMANCE O·F THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT. 
The plaintiff, New Hampshire Insurance Company, 
having prevailed in the, Trial Court and being of the opin-
ion that no error has been committed, admittedly has 
not filed a cross-appeal as defendants seem to think 
it should have done. If plaintiff thought its actions in the 
lovv-er court \vould have lead the court into prejudicial 
error, it should go without saying that it would not have 
taken the steps it did while there. 
In Point II of its Brief, defendants indicate that the 
appropriate relief in this case is to reverse the judgment 
of the trial court with instructions to enter judgment for 
the Lessee, or, in the alternative, to grant defendants a 
ne\V trial. P1aintiffs position is that no error was com-
mitted by the Trial Court and consequently its judgment 
should be affirmed. In presenting its argument at this 
point, in support of its position, plaintiff incorporates 
the lavv and argument presented in Point I of the Brief. 
As pointed out in the State1nent of Facts, plaiintiff 
filed a Co1npla.int for damages against defendants set-
ting forth t\vo counts - one, based on negligence, and the 
other, on absolute liability under the lease. Upon the 
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ruling by the trial court that the Lease did impose abso-
lute liability on defendants, plaintiff, with the court's 
permission, elected to prosecute its claim on the basis 
of absolute liability rather than under negligence and 
thereupon dismissed the negligence count without preju-
dice. Therefore, the theory of the case at trial and the 
posture of the case on appeal were determined by the 
trial court with the urging of plaintiff. 
Defendant was not unjustly penalized by not being 
able to litigate all issues raised by plaintiff's Complaint 
To so assert, under the facts of the case, is to utter the 
anguished, Victorian cry of "It's not fair." Since plain.-
tiff's action was filed, several years ago, defendants have 
had the opportunity to answer all issues brought up by 
plaintiff's 'Complaint and of presenting and explaining 
its position to the court by filing any and all necessary 
pleadings, taking advantage of all permitted discovery 
techniques, having a pre-trial conference of the case 
where all issues were discussed by counsel and the court, 
reviewing the lease and its various provisions, and ar-
guing the law in relation thereto to the trial court before 
trial of the case, and arguing the law to the trial court 
relative to the introduction of extrinsic evidence to show 
the meaning of the lease provisions. After having had 
these opportunities to answer plaintiff's 'Complaint and 
to present its case at trial and rebut plaintiff's case 
at the time of trial, upon the ruling of the trial court, 
after argument by counsel, disposing of all matters of 
law and setting the issues for trial of the matter as is 
the prerogative and the duty of the trial court, defend-
ants protest that it was unjustly penalized by not being 
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entitled to litigate all issues raised in plaintiff's Com-
plaint. Compelling plaintiff to try the case on the theory 
of negligence, even after the court had correctly ruled 
on liability under the lease would require plaintiff to 
proceed on one count regardless of the merit of another 
and would unjustly and unduly burden the parties, coun-
sel, juries, and the court by requiring them to proceed 
vvith matters irrelevant to the right of plaintiff to re-
cover from defendants. The courts and counsel are too 
busy to engage in such nonsense. 
Plaintiff respectfully asserts that the position taken 
by defendants in this case and as presented in Point I 
and Point II of Appellant's Brief is not well taken. 
·Considering the record on appeal, with the exhibits as 
part thereof, and the argument contained in its Brief, 
Appellant is not entitled to the relief it seeks in this 
matter since no error was committed by the Trial Court 
in its disposition of this case. 
Based on the foregoing argument and authorities, 
it appears clear that this court should affirm the judg-
ment of the District ~Court wherein judgment was grant-
ed in favor of plaintiff and against defendants Ballard-
Wade, Inc., and l\1:. R. Ballard, Jr. 
Respectfully submitted, 
l{IPP AND CHARLIER 
D. Gary Christian, Esq. 
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